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essay 
AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 
R. w. Hamming May 13, 1997 
Scientists and engineers have been repeatedly urged to become 
involved in the science-pseudoscience-antiscience discussions that 
are raging around, especially in the courts where, if you believe 
even part of the newspaper reports, nonsense seems at times to 
reign. Therefore, I recently gave some thought to the topic of 
exactly what science is . The results were not what was wanted by 
the urgers, or by me, but honest science requires reporting what 
you find and not suppressing it. 
Science has two faces, the methods used, and the results 
obtained; in this essay we are interested only in the methods used 
in science. Science is not a unique thing to be discussed as if it 
were; it is at best a loose collection of remarks which have been 
made by assorted individuals, and at worst the remarks are totally 
misleading . 
I believe it was in the 60's that a new edition of a famous 
dictionary came out and caused a furor. The editors said bluntly 
that they would not attempt to prescribe, rather they would 
describe how words were used. There is after all, no sacred 
standard to appeal to; the best writers over the centuries, the 
current best writers, or the (whose?) best critics, are all 
arbitrarily defined and give no absolute standard. This caused 
great anguish among those who want an authorative source, such as 
the New Yorker Magazine book reviewer, and the author of the Nero 
Wolfe detective stories who had the hero tear pages out of it and 
put them in the fireplace. 
Similarly I expect that those who like to have authorative 
statements to appeal to will not like this essay which says that I 
will not attempt the foolish act of prescribing how science should 
be done, rather I will describe how some people do it currently or 
have done it in the past. 
In the past we have personified science as if it were a single 
person - "Science says . .. ", "Science has shown ... ". The most 
casual examination will show that "science" as actually done is at 
best a loosely organized mob of individuals, each one mainly 
pursuing their own interests. So far as I can see, .there is no 
formal restriction, no baptismal ritual, for who can call 
themselves a scientist, nor who can claim to speak in the name of 
science. There is a bit of structure in science, for example the 
National Academy of Science actually has some authority to speak 
for scientists, and what they say has some prestige, but it was 
originally created for the benefit of Congress. Money granting 
organizations also have some influence, but again no absolute 
authority to pronounce on what science is. There is no infallible 
Pope of science. 
Usually there is a large gap between those who practice 
science f iom day to day and the philosophers who pontificate about 
what science is; the one does not worry about what science is but 
simply does their thing which they call "science", while all too 
of ten the other have never really done science at all and does not 
know what they are talking about. Now and then a competent 
scientist has written on what they thought science was, but these 
are rare indeed. 
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle all seemed to have believed you 
could talk about anything, truth, beauty, justice, and the gods. 
But even in their time there were the mystery cults who said you 
could not talk about the gods 1 you had to experience them. 
Thousands of years of legal codes, from Hammurabi on, have not 
produced justice, only legalities. And "What is truth?" is a very 
old question that has not been answered adequately. Finally, it is 
widely said that beauty is in the eye of the beholder, not in the 
object itself. 
Even a more modest goal such as defining what mathematics is 
has not resulted in widely accepted definitions - rather upon 
mature thought one comes to realize that again, probably, 
"mathematics must be experienced", and all the talking about 
mathematics is inadequate to say what it is. 
Thus it appears to be useless to try to define sharply what 
science is or is not; indeed science may be a matter of degree and 
not a yes/no situation. At best one can talk around it and repeat 
some of the formulations that have been attempted, along with their 
limitations. 
1. A very common claim is that science depends on controlled 
experiments, but the first science to arise, astronomy, up until 
very recently, could do no controlled experiments, they could only 
choose when and at what they would look. 
2. Another common claim is that a science must make verifiable 
predictions. But evolution is generally considered to be a 
scientific theory, yet in the past it has made almost no 
predictions, just assertions that this is how it probably happened 
in the past. Evolution in the past has been more explanitory than 
predictive. 
3. Another common claim is that science uses mathematics, but for 
a long time botany and zoology, for example, used almost no 
mathematics beyond simple arithmetic and statistics. Many people 
in the "harder sciences" do not think that "management science" is 
a science no matter how much mathematics they may use. Economic 
science is another doubtful science, although often it uses 
elaborate mathematics; indeed it has been said by some people that 
those fields which use the word "science" are not sciences! Again, 
astrology uses a fair amount of mathematics to locate the 
constellations, stars, and planets, but among scientists it is 
reviled as not being scientific. 
4. A very strong component of doing science in the past has been 
the positive effort to show that you are wrong; we seem these days 
not to do it as much as I was taught to do, and as a result (due 
perhaps also to the "publish or perish" rules) much of what is 
published is later found to be "not quite right" . It is always 
fair to ask, "What kinds of evidence will you accept that you are 
wrong?" Before publishing a scientist should have thought long and 
deeply about that question and have a ready answer that is serious, 
not flippant . In a sense, the more positive the person is that 
they are right, the less of a scientist they probably are. 
5. Another claim is that science is based mainly on observations, 
but this is hardly true of some modern science like relativity and 
quantum mechanics where philosophical claims of "the relativity of 
events" is assumed, along with symmetry, and all observations are 
correspondingly interpreted. Cosmology is a good example of much 
theory based on little observation - after all there is only one 
universe to observe! 
6. Popper has emphasized the necessity of disproof, but while it 
is a nice criterion it is surely not absolute. A theory, such as 
the Ptolmaic, which can fit any set of observations (by using 
enough epicycles), is not a scientific theory; a theory which can 
explain every set of data is therefore not a scientific theory, 
according to Popper. Unfortunately, we have often had theories 
which we regard as scientific and yet we know (but prefer usually 
to ignore) some counter evidence. A counter example may merely 
mean that we must modify some detail of the theory rather than 
abandon it, but there seems to come a time when too much "ad 
hockery" causes a theory to be abandoned, mainly on aesthetic 
grounds! 
7. Repeated verification does not always increase the confidence 
in a result . Since around the time of the Stone Age the following 
experiment has been repeatedly done . When there is an eclipse of 
the sun then it is necessary to make a lot of noise to scare off 
the demon that is swallowing the sun, and this has infallibly 
worked; probably for every solar eclipse some people some place 
have made the necessary noise. To suggest that they should have 
tried not doing so on some occasion could have ended the world, so 
the suggestion is ridiculous. 
B. Ockham's razor is often evoked, but what is simple and what is 
complex is subjective to say the least, and hence while useful at 
times, is also at times conveniently ignored. Thus in abstract 
algebra three conditions are usually given to define a certai~ 
thing, but a clever way can reduce them to two conditions. 
Simpler? It is unfortunately hard to go from the two to the three 
conditions , so most books make the larger number of assumptions. 
Indeed , by using suitable logical symbols many different statements 
can be combined into one. When is one statement simpler than many 
statements? 
9. The fruitfulness of a theory in suggesting other things to do 
is a criterion which is seldom mentioned, but it is important. A 
theory which asserts that everything that happens is that which a 
certain entity in a distant galaxy writes down, is a complete 
theory, it explains everything, but is useless currently and hence 
is sterile, so we do not seriously believe it. But it is not 
disprovable and it does explain everything! 
10. It is said that at the bottom science is merely refined 
"common sense", but unfortunately there is no agreement on what 
"common sense" is, except that I have it and perhaps you do not! 
11. It is well known that there can be several alternate theories 
to account for the same body of data, (just as quite different 
electrical networks can have the same transfer function), hence one 
theory cannot be "the right one", and all others are wrong. 
Indeed, Einstein observed that it is of ten the theory that makes 
the data, (much as this seems completely wrong to many 
experimentalists), rather than the data that makes the theory. 
12. It is often claimed that science need only account for the 
observations, and make predictions accurately; "save the 
phenomena", as they often say, (listen to a lot of current quantum 
mechanikers as an illustration of this claim) . But this flies in 
the face of what is often cited as a great step forward in science, 
the shifting from the Ptolmaic to the Copernican system (which I am 
told was at the time the less accurate in its predictions) . 
Science is not merely a convenient mnemonic or prediction system, 
there is an "understanding of what is meant and how it works" that 
is essential if we are to make serious progress. Science is not 
mere formalism, contrary to many current writers and speakers, it 
is a way of thinking while trying to eliminate mysticism along the 
way. Unfortunately, all too often, scientists seem to want to 
inject needless mysticism into their theories, perhaps to make them 
more esoteric! 
13. Science does not explain "why?" . Even Newton knew that he did 
not explain gravity, he merely gave a formula to say how much it 
did. In all of science there is actually no "why", only "how", but 
the tight mesh of interrelationships of the "hows" gives us the 
feeling that gravity, for example. is "why" the planets and 
satellites behave as they do. 
14. There is a belief that science is "objective" and has no 
"subjective" part. This is wishful thinking since we cannot 
achieve total objectivity, but we indeed try to approximate it. As 
noted earlier, the theory you hold to some extent influences what 
you see as data; we never see "reality" directly but only through 
a "window" of our expectations. True, we have learned to view 
things through various windows and this helps towards objectivity. 
But consider Eddington's well known story of the fishermen who went 
fishing in the sea with a net. They examined the size of the fish 
they caught and decided there was a minimum size of the fish in the 
sea. The mental instrument you use influences what you see. 
Thus there is apparently no such thing 
method" the desire for a unique method 
thinking. 
as "the scientific 
is merely wishful 
This is not to be interpreted to mean that all theories are 
equally good . When President Kennedy wanted to get to the moon in 
ten years; he could have appropriated the money for research in ESP 
and hence we could have organized group thought, and, via 
telekinesis, "thought" the people to the moon; or he could have 
spent it on churches to pray the people to the moon; but he chose 
to invest the money in crummy, old science. 
In the long run the measure of science is in its 
effectiveness, both in coping with the world as we experience it, 
and also in the mental world where some theories are preferable to 
others because of the elegance and understandability and not only 
because of their effectiveness. 
A simple test I often use when a new theory is expounded is 
when a person says, "It might be ... ", or "It could be that .. . ", 
I merely repeat the words with "not" inserted. In serious science 
every "might", "could" etc. should be quantified into a probability 
that the speaker is willing to bet on. I find that by using this 
approach many grandeloquent theories collapse. 
Another test is the extent to which the speaker seeks out and 
mentions evidence that might disprove the claims . If potential 
contradictions must be forced on their attention then they are not 
honest scientists. 
Thus what is science t o one person may not be science to 
another person, it is variable depending on the situation and the 
people involved. At best science is a l ocal social convention. 
The appeal to authority is supposed to have no place in 
science, but it is often done. The problem a scientist faces is 
that while in a sense all previous theories have been proven to be 
wrong, still faced with an unexplained event does one consider it 
a miracle or else revise one's theo ry? We have found that the 
appeal to the past (authority ) is usually, but not always, better 
than scrapping our current theories, but there is no sound method 
of deciding which to choose. The new theory when it is new can 
naturally explain less than the old, well developed theory, so the 
test of how much it can explain is not useful in the early stages. 
There one must depend on an indefinable "taste", "style", or 
whatever you care to call it, as to what to do; ignore, embrace, o~ 
stand on the sidelines and contribute nothing to the new theory if 
it wins out . It is not easy to be a good scientist, but it is easy 
to claim to be one! 
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